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Abstract. This study is the first to investigate theoretically and empirically the determinants 
of Diaspora Bonds for eight developing countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri-Lanka) and one developed country - Israel for 
the period 1951 and 2008. Empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical model. The most robust variables are the closeness indicator and the sovereign 
rating, both on the demand-side. The spread is not significant, suggesting Diaspora Bonds 
differ from normal investments. Good governance and wars are also important demand-side 
determinants of Diaspora Bonds. Among the supply-side factors; FDI, ODA, foreign 
exchange, inflation, external debt and remittances significantly determine the issue of 
Diaspora Bonds. Most importantly, this study is able to make predictions of the most 
promising candidate countries in issuing Diaspora Bonds in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
igh budget deficit is a common challenge that many developing countries 
face. While developed countries can rely on perpetual tax revenue to 
finance their budget deficits, developing countries are not successful in 
collecting sufficient tax revenue due to weak economic power, capital flight, tax 
evasion, and malfunctioning financial and capital markets. Under these 
circumstances government of developing countries have four options to finance 
their budget deficit: domestic borrowing, money printing, foreign reserves and 
foreign borrowing. Domestic borrowing is almost impossible due to lack of capital. 
Money printing has undesired side effects, such as inflation. Foreign reserves are 
not sufficiently available. In addition, budget financing with foreign reserves will 
distort the exchange rates. Therefore, developing countries are left with the last 
option: external borrowing. However, developing countries do not have an easy 
access to the international debt markets and are considered to be unreliable debtors 
due to bad experiences that lending countries or institutions have had with 
developing countries` debt obligations, see Michaelowa (2003). When they have an 
access to the foreign financial assistance (grants and loans) from multi- or bilateral 
donors, then this assistance has strict conditionality that governments of developing 
countries can not meet. Therefore, developing countries` governments have to 
make a decision between high interests on international capital markets - if 
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available at all - and conditions by bi- or multilateral donors. However, in times of 
economic and financial crises and also in the long run it is not wise for developing 
countries entirely to depend on external financing, as during these times external 
financing may not be readily available.  
Although workers` remittances constitute an important share of foreign reserves 
for these countries, their effects on development and economic growth are not 
proved to be positive in several studies, see Abdih et al., (2008), Chami et al., 
(2008) and Adams et al., (2008). Especially, when remittances are spent on 
consumption, they further increase financial outflows. 
Therefore, the difficulties with borrowing from international capital markets and 
the adverse effects of remittances motivated governments to develop an alternative 
external borrowing instrument - Diaspora Bond.  
Diaspora Bonds are debt securities issued by governments or government 
agencies and are explicitly target to their Diasporas, see Chander (2001). Diasporas 
are given the option to invest part of their wealth in their homeland in the form of 
Diaspora Bonds. As the issuing country may not able or willing to pay interests 
appropriate to its credit rating (if existent anyway) and market perception, it relies 
on some kind of patriotic discount offered by the buying Diasporas. The idea is that 
by offering Diaspora Bonds instead of asking for donations, the countries can 
leverage the Diaspora's charitable intention.1 Chander (2001) depicts that a person 
who is willing to donate a 100 US$ to a country2, should be ready to buy Diaspora 
Bonds, and, hence, lend its money to that country, to a much larger amount at a 
lower-than-market interest rate. In fact, the amount lent should exactly reach a 
level, where the interest forgone by not investing at a market interest rate 
investment equals US$ 100.  
Indeed, so far, Diaspora Bonds have been issued by several developing 
countries including, most prominently, Israel and India, but also Bangladesh, the 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Ghana and Ethiopia. The last three 
countries only just started their Diaspora Bond very recently. South Africa and 
Kenya have planned to implement Diaspora Bonds. More strikingly, on September 
2010 Greece announced to issue Diaspora Bonds. 
Given the importance and already existence of Diaspora Bonds3, rather little 
research has been devoted to understand the determinants of Diaspora bonds 
theoretically and also empirically. In this paper first we introduce a theoretical 
polito-economical model of supply and demand for Diaspora Bonds. Then we test 
this model for large sample countries that have issued Diaspora Bonds.  Our 
empirical results are not only consistent with the predictions of our theoretical 
model, but also deliver important policy implications.  
Section 2 introduces the theoretical model. Section 3 gives the results of the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our 
results. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
This Section analyses the incentives to issue and buy Diaspora Bonds for the 
issuer and the buyer, respectively. Hypotheses for the determinants of the supply 
and demand of these bonds are developed from the theoretical and empirical 
literature on development finance and on Diaspora Bonds. The issuer's motivations 
and trade-offs represent the supply determinants. The buyer's decision making 
process determines the demand factors. Merging supply and demand leads to a 
complete model. The complete model includes both supply- and demand side 
factors that determine Diaspora bonds. 
 
2.1. Issuer incentives - supply side 
The issuer of a Diaspora Bond is either the government or in some cases the 
central bank (or another public entity). In any case, the decision to issue such a 
bond will depend on the government's budget planning. The following simplified 
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model has the basic assumption is that the government finances its expenditure 
with tax income and deficit, see Fischer & Easterly (1990). 
 
Expenditures = Tax Income + Deficit       (1) 
 
The deficit can be financed through a mixture of money printing, the use of 
foreign reserves, foreign borrowing or domestic borrowing, Fischer & Easterly 
(1990): 
 
Deficit = Money Printing + Foreign Reserve use + Foreign Borrowing  
+ Domestic Borrowing          (2)    
 
Diaspora Bonds are a part of foreign borrowing, and then the equation (2) can 
be refined into: 
 
Foreign Borrowing = Deficit – Money Printing – Foreign Reserve use  
– Domestic Borrowing         (3) 
 
The dependent variable - foreign borrowing - in equation (3) also includes the 
Diaspora Bond which is the variable of interest in our analysis. The right hand side 
variable, the deficit is positively correlated with foreign borrowing. This is logical, 
as the budget deficit is a basic precondition for the consideration of Diaspora 
Bonds as a source of funds for developing countries.  
In order to understand the correlation between budget deficit and foreign 
borrowing better, we substitute the deficit with expenditures minus tax income (as 
defined in equation (1)): 
 
Foreign Borrowing = (Expenditures – Tax Income) – Money Printing  
– Foreign Reserve use – Domestic Borrowing     (4) 
 
The basic source of sovereign revenue is taxation. If a country can rely on a 
sufficiently high tax base and if the administration is capable of collecting these 
taxes, it will prefer this kind of funding, as with this instrument there is no need to 
repay the funds. Therefore, it is in general accepted that external borrowing and tax 
revenue are substitutes.  
Money printing is another way to finance budget deficit. Money printing as a 
means to finance the budget deficit is usually directly associated with inflation.4 
Therefore, it is avoided in most of the time.  
Foreign reserves can be utilized to finance the budget deficit, when they are 
available. However, when the foreign exchange reserves are expected to be 
exhausted, the currency will devaluate Krugman (1979). This can lead to a balance 
of payments crisis, which often is itself the very reason for issuing Diaspora Bonds. 
The example of India is consistent with this argument. Therefore, a measure of 
foreign reserves is included into the model for two reasons: It captures the 
substituting possibility (the running down of foreign exchange) and at the same 
time it captures one of the most named motives for issuing Diaspora Bonds.  
The issue of domestic borrowing versus external borrowing is rather complex, 
and therefore, Panizza (2008) suggests that rather the characteristics of the debt 
should be analyzed. In addition, Drazen (1998) or Vasishtha (2007) argue that 
countries have different incentives to repay debt held by residents than by non-
residents and the interest-differentials differ between foreign and domestically held 
debt. However, the effect of the domestic debt could not be analyzed empirically, 
due to lack of data for majority of countries in our sample.  
Up to now, the left hand side variable - Foreign Borrowing remained 
aggregated. We separate Diaspora Bonds from other sovereign external debt by 
moving Other External Borrowing into the right-hand side of the equation: 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 5(1), S. Akkoyunlu, & M. Stern, p.57-80. 
60 
60 
Diaspora Bonds = (Expenditures – Tax Income) – Money Printing – Foreign 
Reserve use – Domestic Borrowing – Other External Borrowing         (5) 
 
Equation (5) suggests that other external debt can substitute Diaspora Bonds to 
finance the budget deficit. Although this is a rather simple assumption it is often 
argued that Diaspora Bonds are issued when ordinary external debt can not be 
issued on the international debt market or only at very high interest rates are 
available, see Fischer & Easterly (1990).5  
An increased issuance of Diaspora Bonds would therefore allow a decrease in 
other external debt. In our analysis, ODA, Remittances, Trade and FDI are 
included in order to account for other external debt. These additional variables will 
also account for the political factors in government's finance decision. This 
extension is particularly important as Diaspora Bonds cannot be seen just as an 
ordinary monetary instrument. The political feature of issuing Diaspora Bonds is to 
target countries with large Diaspora population, and to attract Diasporas` savings 
and remittances and therefore to concentrate on more characteristics of sovereign 
finance than just expenditures, taxes, money printing, use of foreign reserves and 
debt.  
The budgets of developing countries constitute a large amount of ODA lent by 
developed nations. The question of how ODA transfers and external borrowing are 
connected is subject to academic discussion since the pioneer work by Heller 
(1975). Feeny & McGillivray (2003) show that there is a positive correlation 
between aid and borrowing (net of aid loans). Consistent with their previous study 
(McGillivray & Morrissey, 2001) receiving governments have misperceptions and 
illusions about the real or nominal value of aid. Therefore, overspending leads to 
additional borrowing. However, Mavrotas & Ouattara (2003) show for Côte 
d'Ivoire that despite the importance of the aid type6, sovereign borrowing is 
negatively correlated with aid. Also for Ghana there is evidence of (domestic) 
borrowing decreasing with aid, see Osei, Morrissey & Lloyd (2005). Finally, an 
Ouattara (2006) show with panel analysis is that aid and borrowing are substitutes 
for 20 years. Acknowledging the ongoing discussion on this issue7, the hypotheses 
on the correlation between ODA and Diaspora Bonds supply is expected to be 
rather weak.  
In addition, the type of aid has an important influence on its impact on fiscal 
policy, Mavrotas & Ouattara (2003). As shown in Gupta et al., (2004), opposed to 
ODA grants, ODA loans do have an impact on domestic revenue. However, in the 
present case it would be too complex to include all the different types of aid into 
the empirical model. From a theoretical point of view, however, this differentiation 
certainly makes sense. 
Even though FDI does not directly fund a country's government budget, it can 
stimulate the host country's economy and bring foreign currency into the country. 
Doing this, it will generate tax revenue for the government and income for the 
workers. Picht & Stüven (1991) touch the issue of FDI as a substitute for 
borrowing. Also, Agarwal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp (1991) consider FDI as a 
possibility to substitute for other external (private) financing. These articles were 
published in light of the past debt crisis of the 1980s, which is especially 
interesting for the current financial crisis. Judging the effect of FDI on the 
government's decision whether to issue a Diaspora Bond or not still is difficult. 
However, the government will probably consider FDI as an alternative way to 
attract foreign capital as mentioned by the above cited authors.  
There are some entry costs into the Diaspora Bond market. Different tolls, 
charges and fees might be required; for example to the commercial seller of the 
Bonds or for SEC registration. Therefore, a threshold number of potential investors 
are required for a successful launch of a Diaspora Bond. Many Diaspora Bonds 
explicitly target remittance senders, for example in the Gulf countries. The way, in 
which the Diaspora - as a possible source of external finance - is perceived by its 
home country governments crucially, depends on the impact it is expected to have. 
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Therefore, in estimating the impact the Diaspora could have on its home country, 
the amount of money remitted may well be a more accurate measure than the total 
number of emigrants of a country, see also Van Hear (1998) and Hirschman, 
Kasinitz & DeWind (1999). Consequently, the amount of remittances (in relation 
to the size of the home country economy) is expected to act as a signal for the 
home country government. A high ratio of remittances to the gross national income 
(GNI) indicates a large amount of Diaspora investments that could possibly be 
attracted via Diaspora Bonds. 
By taking into the entire hypothesis mentioned above, the supply for Diaspora 
Bonds can now be modelled as: 
 
Bs = (G – T) – INF – FX – EDT – ODA – FDI + REM     (6) 
 
The abbreviations for the different variables are explained below: 
sB    denotes  Diaspora Bond supply 
G  denotes  Government Spending 
T  denotes  Tax Income 
INF  denotes  Inflation 
FX  denotes  Foreign Reserves 
EDT denotes  External Public Borrowing 
ODA denotes  Amount of ODA received 
FDI  denotes  Foreign Direct Investments (inflow) 
REM denotes  Remittances 
 
2.2. Buyer incentives - demand side 
Although investment decision is based on the comparison of expected financial 
earnings, for Diaspora investments, the expected social and emotional returns are 
crucial, see Nielsen & Riddle (2007).  
However, we start modelling the decision making process with purely economic 
assumptions: A Diaspora member compares the Diaspora Bond of her home 
country to an investment alternative. This is done in two ways: 
 Ketkar & Ratha (2009a) compare the Diaspora Bond coupon to an equally 
rated 
U.S. corporate bond coupon. 
 Chander (2001) compares the Diaspora Bond coupon to an average 
regional US$ sovereign bond coupon.  
However, the comparison of Ketkar & Ratha (2009a) is not quite correct with 
regard to the public guarantee which sovereign bonds and Diaspora Bonds enjoy in 
contrast to corporate bonds. Concerning Israel, Ketkar & Ratha (2009a) somewhat 
inconsistently compare the coupons of DCI bonds with U.S. Treasury bills by 
ignoring the risk difference between the two countries. What seems to be the most 
interesting comparison is one that compares the Diaspora Bond coupons to the 
ordinary home-country treasury bills8 (given, the latter is in foreign currency and of 
equal maturity). Using this comparison, the same investment risk can be assumed 
and the difference is only defined by the patriotic discount9 (and, to some extent, 
the denomination, which is higher in all cases of Treasury bills). This approach is 
very similar to the one Chander (2001) follows.10 However, data gathering on 
historical interest rates of exotic bonds from developing countries is not an easy 
task. In many cases, developing countries do neither have a very long, nor a very 
successful history of sovereign bond issues on the international market. As it was 
not possible to gather the data on coupons of the respective treasuries, the Diaspora 
Bond interest rates will all be compared to the U.S. Treasury bills of the same 
maturity. Hence, in the empirical analysis the Diaspora Bonds are compared to so-
called Eurobonds.  
However, Diaspora investors may not be interested in income from the interest, 
and therefore they may ignore the additional interest when buying Diaspora Bonds. 
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Many Diaspora Bonds under consideration come with a so-called patriotic 
discount. Altruism provides a possible explanation. As discussed for example by 
Akkoyunlu (2008), remittances are motivated by several motives such as altruism. 
This could also be the case for Diaspora Bonds. By lending money to the 
government of the home country, public goods for all citizens may be provided11, 
and in the long run, the Diaspora investor could as well profit from this 
development when she/he faces a better investment climate in the home country. 
No matter, whether this consideration is labelled altruistic or egoistic in the long 
run, the pure fact that Diaspora investors are ready to buy bonds that require a 
patriotic discount already show - to a certain degree – a behaviour which is not 
completely led by a purely financial consideration. There are in fact studies that 
show how patriotism can influence investment decisions (Morse & Shive 2006). 
But even when this patriotism or altruism12 is taken into consideration, it can be 
argued that the Diaspora favours a smaller patriotic discount. The spread measures 
the difference between the U.S. Treasury bill coupon and the Diaspora Bond 
coupon. Hence, the lower the value of the spread, the lower the patriotic discount. 
The spread turns negative as long as the Diaspora Bonds coupon is higher than the 
U.S. Treasury bill coupon, which should mostly be the case. The threshold value, 
where the patriotic discount disappears, cannot be determined, as comparing 
Diaspora Bonds coupons to the U.S. Treasury bills implies ignoring the risk 
differential.  
For their investment decision, members of the Diaspora will assess the 
government's willingness to repay and its ability to repay the amount lent via 
Diaspora Bonds at maturity. The assessment of the ability to repay seems sensible, 
as it considers certain economic indicators that describe a government's capability 
of repaying outstanding debt. The term "willingness to repay" perhaps needs a 
closer look: As there is no mechanism to compensate lenders in case of a sovereign 
default, in theory the question arose, why governments have an incentive to repay 
their debts at all (willingness to repay). Two explanations are provided by the 
literature:  
 The government cares about its reputation in order to take out loans in the 
future (Eaton & Gersowitz, 1981). This would imply that a country that has closer 
links to the world will repay its debts with higher probability, as it relies on 
perpetual lending. 
 The government cares about possible sanctions in the event of debt 
repudiation (Bulow & Rogoff, 1989). This explanation would imply that countries 
with a higher output are more creditworthy as their economies are more vulnerable 
to sanctions in case of debt repudiation (Lane 2004). 
Gelos et al., (2004) argue that in fact there is no clear-cut distinction between a 
sovereign government's ability and willingness to repay. For example, while a 
government may in principle repay because a country's net worth is greater than its 
debt, repayment may not be feasible because it may either imply strong political 
opposition or severe humanitarian consequences such as starvation. When 
assessing countries’ willingness and ability to repay, investors rely heavily on 
standard indicators such as credit ratings to monitor the borrower (Ratha et al., 
2009). A country's sovereign rating by one of the big rating agencies, Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch), Moody's Investors Service, and Standard and Poor's (S&P) is therefore the 
key for access to the international credit market. As mentioned above, many 
developing countries - 70, to be exact - do not even have a sovereign credit rating. 
Of the 86 developing countries that do have such a rating, only 15 have one longer 
than 5 years (Ratha et al., 2009). Ratha et al., (2009) provide an overview over 
models which allow to determine sovereign ratings of unrated countries (so-called 
shadow-ratings) and they also provide an own model, which seems to correlate 
heavily with the sovereign ratings by the big rating agencies. Most of the countries 
in the dataset, however, do have a sovereign rating, at least for most of the time 
they are issuing Diaspora Bonds. Hence, for the empirical analysis, an index with 
22 categories is constructed to convert Standard and Poor's sovereign long-term 
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rating for foreign currency credit (Standard and Poor's, 2007) into a categorical 
variable.  
Until now, we have concentrated on purely economic factors. However, the 
home country's government policy or governance is also assessed by Diasporas 
when making the investment decision. Good governance is a concept which is used 
very differently and the definitions and measures in the literature will probably 
again differ from the very subjective view of a Diaspora member on its home 
country. There are many indicators which attempt to measure good governance at 
least to some extent. A good overview is given by Kaufmann et al., (2008). In our 
empirical section, we use Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" (Freedom 
House, 2009) to measure good governance for several reasons. Firstly it has a very 
individual-based approach: "The survey does not rate governments or government 
performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and social freedoms enjoyed by 
individuals" (Freedom House, 2009). This approach makes it valuable for the 
investment decision, as Diaspora investors will probably consider the experience 
they or their families make regularly in the home countries. They will assess their 
own and their family's freedom inside the home country. Secondly, the database is 
very comprehensive, providing annual data since 1972 and for 193 countries. 
Thirdly, it has an easy access.  
The connection between the Diaspora and its home country certainly affects the 
Diasporas investment decision should be included in our theoretical model. This 
connection is clearly not directly observable, but there are certain indicators for it. 
The sending of remittances is 13 certainly a good indicator for a connection, 
especially with regard to Diaspora Bonds. By sending remittances, members of the 
Diaspora stay in touch with their families, but also with authorities and even 
financial institutions of their home countries. Many Diaspora Bonds are directly 
targeted at wage earners that send remittances home. The bonds are sometimes also 
explicitly labelled an instrument to channel remittances and make them more 
efficient. Although remittances tap the emigrant's wages and Diaspora Bonds the 
emigrant's savings (Ketkar & Ratha 2009a) the targeted emigrant is the same. 
Therefore, it can be expected that a Diaspora that sends a large amount of 
remittances through formal channels13 is better connected to its home country and 
more aware of the financial products it offers. The higher the extent each migrant is 
involved in this connecting act of sending remittances, the closer the Diaspora is 
considered to be to its home country. The closeness will thus be measured in 
remittances per migrant. Several studies can support this measure of closeness by 
showing that emigrants with relatives in the home country generally send more 
remittances per capita or are more likely to send remittances, see Menjivar et al., 
(1998) and Blue (2004). 
One of the most important motives for the Diaspora Bonds demand is an 
ideological one. As most Diaspora Bonds relies on a patriotic discount, the investor 
must be willing to provide this discount. A country that is shaken by civil war may 
have a large number of emigrants. But these emigrants probably have been 
displaced or expelled by the enemy population group and are therefore assumedly 
not ready to give them a patriotic discount. Here, we rather expect a patriotic 
surcharge, if any lending takes place at all.  
Having described the determinants for bond demand, we can write it as follows: 
 
BD = (iE – iD) + RAT + GOV + CLO - WAR      (7) 
 
Where; 
DB   denotes  Diaspora Bond Demand 
 iE   denotes  Interest Rate of Equivalent Investment 
 iD   denotes  Interest Rate of Diaspora Bond 
RAT denotes  Sovereign Rating 
GOV denotes  Governance 
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CLO denotes  Diaspora Closeness 
WAR denotes  Civil War 
 
2.3. The complete model - supply and demand sides 
As we have shown buyers' and sellers' incentives determine the supply and 
demand for Diaspora Bonds. However, these two decisions are simultaneous and 
determine the equilibrating level of Diaspora Bonds: 
 
BS = (G – T) – INF – FX – EDT – ODA – FDI + REM                 (8) 
 
BD = (iE – iD) + RAT + GOV + CLO - WAR                  (9) 
 
One question that might arise is whether the model needs to be specified as a 
simultaneous equation model. The fact that it is a supply/demand model which is 
supposed to be estimated, suggests a simultaneous equation, as in general such a 
model is specified in the following way: 
 
Demand Function: Qd = β0 + β1 * P + e                             (10) 
 
Supply Function: Qs = β0 + β1 * P + e                                 (11) 
 
Equilibrum Condition: Qd = Qs                                          (12) 
where dQ  stands for quantity demanded and sQ  for quantity supplied. 
Insertion results in a supply function that is dependent on the quantity demanded 
and vice versa. Price (P) and Quantity are jointly determined. Due to the 
endogenity in this model, a simultaneous equation14 (12) would be required. 
However, in the Diaspora Bonds model set up above, there are no two variables 
that are jointly determined (like the price (P) in equations (10) and (11)). The 
quantity of Diaspora Bonds sold does not affect any of the independent variables. 
They are all considered being exogenous.15 The only variable that could perhaps be 
somehow determined by the quantity of Diaspora Bonds sold might be the spread 
))i- ((i DE . This could be the case, if it is assumed that the issuer adjusts the 
coupon of the Diaspora Bond depending on the amount demanded (or, in a second 
period, the amount sold). But looking at the data, this is in fact hardly ever done.16 
In the context of Diaspora Bonds, the issuing countries seem not to necessarily 
seek to minimize the interest rates of the Diaspora Bonds. Diaspora Bond investors 
serve as a lender of last resort, when the international market perception of 
investment risk is substantially different from the Diaspora's perception of that risk. 
The market power of the issuing countries is by nature quite low. This leads to a 
model, where different exogenous independent variables influence the equilibrium 
quantity on demand- and supply-side. The supply side offers a bond at a certain 
interest rate, while the quantity to be sold is mostly flexible. Thus, supply and 
demand curves of an abstract model would look like the ones in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Supply- and Demand-Curves for Diaspora Bonds 
Note: that moving up the Y-Axis means lowering the interest rate 
 
Consequently, these two equations are aggregated into a single one, which gives 
the equilibrium level of Diaspora Bonds (BE) as a dependent variable. 
Additionally, some control variables will be included into the model. Eichengreen 
& Mody (2000) suggest including the bond characteristics when analyzing the 
determinants of the spread for an emerging market debt. To account for that, 
currency, maturity and denomination of the bonds are also integrated into the full 
model (not that, as control variables, they are not explicitly stated in the following 
equation): 
 
Bs = (G - T) – INF – FX – EDT – ODA – FDI + REM + (iE – iD) + RAT  
+ GOV + CLO – WAR                  (13) 
 
Another refinement of the model, which is not explicitly stated in the model 
above, is that the supply-side variables are lagged for two years in our empirical 
analysis. This lag structure stems from the assumption that the process of designing 
and placing of the Diaspora Bond with the Diaspora abroad takes at least one year. 
During the period of designing the bonds, the economists in charge, in particular 
those in developing countries do hardly have access to data that is newer than one 
year. This implies that at the time the Diaspora investors make their investment 
decision, the data for the home country's supply decision already lies (at least) two 
years in the past. 
 
3. Empirical Analyses 
3.1. The salient feature of the data on Diaspora Bonds 
The data on Diaspora Bonds is not very rich, as only recently it was considered 
an interesting tool for development finance. For Israel, a comprehensive dataset for 
more than fifty years is available (Rehavi & Weingarten, 2004). India, being the 
second most important issuer of Diaspora Bonds, has only fifteen years of 
experience with this instrument. Additionally, there is data for Bangladesh since 
2001. For all the other countries, the experience is very limited. For some of them, 
only the amount offered by the issuing entity is known, together with the terms and 
conditions (coupon, maturity, currency, minimum amount). Our sample consists of 
nine countries Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka. Data has been compiled starting from 1951 (the first 
issuance of Israeli Diaspora Bonds) up to 2008 (the most recent available data).  
An overview of the data is given in Appendix – Table 1. The dependent 
variable, which is Diaspora Bonds balance (i.e. the debt liabilities on the respective 
accounts in the balance of payments) has 493 observations, 39 are missing. Clearly, 
a majority of observations (388) take a value of zero whenever there is no Diaspora 
Bond issued. This leaves 104 observations above zero. The fact that the dataset is 
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left-censored requires special attention. The most common way to solve the 
problem is the estimation of a Tobit-regression. However, also other estimation 
techniques are dealt with in the following section. The budget deficit (G - T) and 
the spread  )i (i DE  do only have quite few observations. The effect of this lack of 
data point will be seen in the regressions, where in fact, only one or mostly even 
neither of the two variables could be included in the same regression. All the other 
variables have sufficient 17 amount of observations, however, the control variables 
maturity, denomination and currency are either dummies or discrete variables, 
which cause problems, especially in fixed effects regressions. Again emphasized 
here should be at this point the characteristics of the spread variable: The 
difference in coupons rate between U.S. Treasury Bills and the Diaspora Bond does 
not measure the "true" patriotic discount, but it still captures the profit-lead 
investment decision of the Diaspora. However, the negative values of the spread 
(where the Diaspora Bond coupon is higher than the U.S. Treasury Bill) can still 
incorporate a patriotic discount compared to normal sovereign bond coupons of 
that country. Still, the more negative the spread, the lower the patriotic discount by 
trend, at some threshold turning into an unpatriotic surplus. 
 
3.2. Panel data analysis 
The panel data analysis section is divided into several steps, where with each 
step, the estimation method applied is more sophisticated. Respecting the panel 
form of the data, ordinary least square (OLS) with fixed effects (FE) or, where 
applicable, random effects (RE) general least square (GLS) method was applied 
first. The Hausman test was performed to see whether country fixed effects were 
necessary or not. The estimations results can be seen in Table 2. First of all, as 
already mentioned above, there are many variables and also some correlations 
between independent variables are high, which makes it impossible to include all 
variables into the model. This is true in particular for the bond characteristics, 
which were supposed to be included as control variables. However, the currency 
variable is a dummy, meaning that if fixed effects are applied, the currency 
variable has to be dropped. If integrated into a random effects model it does not 
have any significant impact. A longer maturity seems to have a negative impact on 
the attractiveness of Diaspora Bonds. However, there is not much variation in the 
maturity variable, which ranges only from three to fifteen years with a mean of 
around six years. Also denomination seems to have a narrow positive impact. 
However, in general, it seems that we can not rely too much on the bond 
characteristic variables for a serious judgement.  
First regressions deliver some quite interesting results. Two variables - the 
closeness indicator (which is remittances per member of the Diaspora) and 
remittances (as % of GNI) are significant throughout all specifications, see Table 2. 
The closeness indicator, which is supposed to be a demand-side factor, has the 
expected sign. As argued above, Diasporas who are sending more remittances per 
member are much more closely connected to their home countries and 
subsequently ready to buy more Diaspora Bonds. The coefficient size is very small 
compared to the other coefficients, but this variable is measured in US$ per 
emigrant, which makes it quite important.17 Remittances were expected to be some 
kind of signal for the issuing countries. This signal was expected to be interpreted 
as a positive one for the Diaspora's demand for Diaspora Bonds. However, 
obviously, remittances are rather seen as an alternative source for foreign 
exchange, serving as a substitute for Diaspora Bonds.  
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Table 2. Coefficients of Random- and Fixed-Effects Regressions 
 
 
Rating is also significant with an expected sign. However, rating might 
represent other factors such as the shadow ratings (Ketkar & Ratha 2009a). In 
addition it may also correlate with some other exogenous variables in our model. 
However, our initial investigation shows that the correlations are not high. 
Therefore, we can still argue that Diasporas, although wanting to support their 
home country, try to minimize the investment risk.  
Speaking of risk, the FDI variable is positive throughout the regressions as 
opposed to the predictions of our theoretical model. In our theoretical model FDI 
was considered as a supply-side factor to substitute for Diaspora Bonds by 
providing foreign currency inflows. However, the positive sign in empirical results 
can reflect two effects: Firstly, it could serve as a signal for Diaspora Bond 
investors who are looking for some first-mover investors who are paving the 
ground for further investment and therewith making investments safer (risk effect). 
Secondly, if the Diaspora investor is, himself, an FDI source (an FDI investor), he 
may see Diaspora Bonds as a mean to support the country which – in return - 
provides public goods whereof her FDI investments may benefit (externality 
effect). The fact that FDI turns significant only in the fixed-effects regression 
makes country characteristics - for example different tax structures - reasonable in 
explaining a share of this variable.  
It seems that Diaspora Bonds are not associated with the common risk 
perception pattern as in other types of investment. This becomes obvious when 
having a look at the civil war variable, which shows a strong and significant 
positive coefficient on Diaspora Bonds. This connection is unexpected by the 
theoretical model, yet it is consistent with the findings of Ketkar & Ratha (2009a) 
that particularly in times of crises the Diaspora Bonds serve as a stable source of 
external finance. During the 6-Days war for Israel and in the aftermath of the 
nuclear testing of India, both countries were able to raise an extra ordinary amount 
of foreign exchange. It must be noted, though, that the civil war variable is so far 
significant only in the fixed-effects model, which is critical, as we do not have 
much variation in this variable.  
External debt, foreign exchange and ODA show, when significant, the expected 
negative signs. This result is consistent with our theoretical model that is to raise 
foreign exchange is one of the main reasons for countries to issue Diaspora Bonds.  
As for governance, the regression results show the expected correlation too.18 
Good governance is indeed an important factor for the Diaspora's investment 
decision. It seems that the Diaspora's perception of good governance could be 
measured quite well with this index. The rather time-invariant variable governance 
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is not significant in the fixed-effects model and this can be explained by the 
inserted country dummies that control for country characteristics.  
Three variables show no significance at all: The budget deficit, inflation, and 
the spread. For the budget deficit the insufficient amount of observations might be 
the reason. The inflation may indeed have no influence on Diaspora Bonds, thereby 
pointing to altruistic motives of Diasporas (Akkoyunlu, 2008), rather than to the 
money printing incentive by the issuing country, as theoretically modelled. 
However, it must be kept in mind that there is a certain correlation between 
inflation and the rating. And although it is not significant, a measure of inflation is 
probably integrated in the rating variable.  
Finally, what is interesting in terms of patriotism in the investment decision is 
the fact that the spread seems to be completely insignificant. It must be kept in 
mind that there is quite some correlation with other explanatory variables. But, 
there was no combination of variables that lead to a significance of the spread 
variable. Indeed, this may point once again to the fact that the investment decision 
on Diaspora Bonds is very different from a common investment decision. It 
happens to be that the Diaspora does not really compare different investment 
options (at least for that amount of money for which they consider an investment in 
Diaspora Bonds).19  
So far, it seems that the investment decision for the Diaspora strongly depends 
on its closeness to the home country, on the good governance of the home country, 
on the alternative external financing (remittances) and on the rating of the home 
country, which indicates the latter's willingness and ability to repay the debt.  
The analysis has so far ignored the fact that a large amount of the observed 
values is zero (388 out of 493). The zeros are "true" zeros, meaning that there was 
no wrong data coding or errors.20 The zeros simply state that the country did not 
issue a Diaspora Bond at that point of time. This large amount of zeros in the 
dependent variable may skew the distribution which then can bias an OLS 
regression. The fact that the dependent variable is by definition limited at zero and 
we can observe those zeros make it censored.21 The simplest way - and one that is 
often pursued (see Frankel, 1997) - to solve the problem is to drop all zero 
observations. However, this of course can also bias the results, especially in a case 
like the present one where a large amount of dependent variable values are zero. If 
the zero values should be kept in the model, the standard way to handle the 
problem of a censored dependent variable is to apply Tobit model. This is done in 
the following. There is a number of ways to deal with large amounts of zero-values 
however; they are mostly designed for discrete dependent variables.22  
In gravity models for trade or migration such as in Santos Silva & Tenreyro 
(2006), Flowerdew & Aitkin (1982), and Frankel (1997), the zero values are 
handled by adding small values (mostly 1) to them and then transforming all values 
into logarithmic form in order to avoid negative predicted values for the dependent 
value (when estimating OLS). Yet this does not solve the problem of the model at 
hand, as the log of 1 is, again, zero, which solves the gravity model problem but 
not the zero problem in general.23 Additionally, all above cited authors mention 
certain problems with this transformation, especially in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity which is very likely, again, due to the zero values. Another 
option, suggested by Wooldridge (2002) is to use the exponential function of the 
independent variables (exp(x)) and then estimate beta using nonlinear least squares 
(NLS), but this has the same limitations due to heteroscedasticity and will also lead 
to inconsistent estimates (like all nonlinear transformations), see Santos Silva & 
Tenreyro (2006). To avoid these problems, Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) and 
subsequently also Desbordes & Vicard (2009) apply a Poisson pseudo maximum 
likelihood model (PPML), also called Poisson quasi maximum likelihood model 
(PQML). Although mostly used for count data, Poisson regressions may also be 
used for continuous data, see Ancelet et al., (2009) and Flowerdew & Aitkin 
(1982).  
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The application of the PPML in a (aid or) trade context is a relatively new way 
to account for the problem of many zeros in gravity models of bilateral trade or 
bilateral FDI (see Desbordes & Vicard, 2009 and Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2009). 
However, while Desbordes & Vicard (2009) apply PPML and are therefore able to 
include the zero observations into the model, Nowak-Lehmann et al., (2009) are 
sceptic concerning the model's ability to deal with heteroscedasticity.  
In our empirical analysis, some Tobit regressions are first performed, before 
testing the results by applying a PPML model.24  In Table 3 the results of the Tobit 
equations and the PPML equation will be compared.  
 
Table 3. Coefficients of the Tobit and PPML Regressions 
 
 
The Tobit regressions largely support the findings from the OLS and GLS 
regressions. Most importantly, the closeness variable keeps its sign and stays 
significant. Also, the rating stays significant and positive throughout regressions 
(5) to (7), further supporting this variable's importance. Civil war keeps being an 
important factor with significant positive values in regressions (6) and (7).  
Inflation, as well as the spread and the budget deficit (not showed), stay 
insignificant. The foreign reserves variable underlines significantly that it is one of 
the main reasons for countries to issue Diaspora Bonds. ODA, on the other hand, 
stays a fundraising alternative to Diaspora Bonds. Where significant (in regression 
(6)), FDI can be interpreted as in the OLS regressions although contradicting the 
theoretical model: Firstly, high FDI investments could serve the investor as a signal 
for the trustworthiness of the country. And secondly, Diaspora Bond investments 
could be a complement to FDI investments.  
However, the variables for governance, external debt and remittances do show 
other results: Governance is no longer significant in the Tobit regressions; 
however, it shows the expected sign and turns significant again in the PPML 
regression (8). External debt changes the signs and is positively correlated with 
Diaspora Bonds in one of the regressions. This should not be over-interpreted as 
the external debt variable is correlated not only with ODA, but also with 
denomination, closeness, FDI and foreign reserves. Dropping the control variables 
also turns external debt insignificant. Far more important, the remittances variable 
turns sings and now is positive, at least in regressions (5) and (6). This would be 
consistent with the model and attribute the remittances again a signal function for 
the issuing country. This is the most striking change when moving from simple 
OLS to Tobit regression.  
Now moving on to the comparison of the Tobit results to the PPML results, 
which should be correcting for a disputed amount of heteroscedasticity, the 
coefficients for closeness, foreign exchange and ODA are now found insignificant. 
On the other hand, also the values for governance and maturity changed and 
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became, like in the OLS regressions, significant in the expected way. So if indeed, 
the PPML model is able to correct the heteroscedasticity which is certainly also 
caused by the large amount of zero values in the sample, closeness, foreign 
exchange, and ODA do not have the expected effect on Diaspora Bonds. For ODA 
and foreign exchange, there were already mixed results in the OLS regressions. Far 
more surprising is the fact that closeness is no longer significant, although it prove 
significant in all OLS and Tobit regressions. The other variables, rating, civil war, 
external debt, inflation, FDI and remittances, show results comparable to the Tobit 
regressions. Rating, civil war, inflation and FDI are consistent also with the OLS 
regressions, further underlining their robustness. The spread and budget deficit 
variables again reduced the regressions to very small samples. Nevertheless, the 
variables were tested (not shown in the results tables) but not found significant.  
The Tobit model (and also the PPML model), however, has some weaknesses if 
applied to the data at hand. The Tobit model assumes that the same independent 
variables determine if there is investment in Diaspora Bonds at all and if yes, then 
how much. In the present case, it might be argued that the selection of which 
countries do have a positive value of Diaspora Bonds is determined rather by 
supply factors than by demand factors. This assumption stems from the fact that the 
issuer offers Diaspora Bonds in the first place, without complete information on the 
demand for these bonds. In a second step, the buyers demand a certain amount of 
Diaspora Bonds, depending on the offer already made by the issuer. As argued 
before, the model incorporates the assumption that once the offer is made, the 
amount sold rather depends on the demand than on supply (also compare Figure 1). 
This would imply that the allocation equation is dominated by the demand-side 
coefficients. The observation that for all countries in the sample, there is no zero 
value due to a lack of demand25 underlines the argument just made.  
There are two basic ways to deal with this sample selection: The first one is a 
model with two steps, including a Probit regression for the selection equation and 
an OLS regression for the allocation equation. The other model is a Heckman 
regression, which performs both regressions but connects the error terms of the 
first (Probit) regression to the second one by adding the inverse Mill's ratio 
(Heckman, 1976). Note that for the Probit equation, a dummy variable for Diaspora 
Bonds is created, turning 1 whenever a Diaspora Bond is observed and 0 if no 
Diaspora Bonds is observed. Missing values are coded 1, as they reflect 
observations where a Diaspora Bond was in fact issued, but the exact value is 
unknown. The results of the two methods are presented in Table 4:  
 
Table 4. Coefficients of the Heckman and Probit/OLS two-step Regressions 
 
 
Starting with the supply-side variables in the selection equations, it can be 
observed that external debt, ODA and remittances are significant and consistent 
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with the model. The FDI is again positive and significant. A plausible explanation 
for this has already been provided. Foreign exchange is not significant in the 
Heckman and Probit/OLS regressions, but negative throughout all regressions but 
one (1), also including the Tobit, PPML and OLS regressions. This certainly 
indicates that a negative correlation is highly probable. Inflation is significant only 
in Heckman regressions, which makes it not very plausible. Though, in the 
selection process, it could still play the role of money printing as a substitute for 
the issuance of Diaspora Bonds. Such a correlation was expected from the 
theoretical model. The budget deficit variable (G - T) is excluded in the regressions 
presented, again, due to a lack of observations. Incorporating it into the model did 
not yield a significant result.  
Moving on, to the allocation equation and the demand-side variables, the spread 
variable is once more insignificant. This again confirms our argument that the 
investment decision does not seem to be a trade-off between investment 
alternatives (at least not one to the U.S. Treasury bills), but rather a calculation of 
risk and some feelings of connection and ties to the home country. In line with this 
argumentation, the rating and the closeness variables are again (mostly) significant 
(note that closeness and spread are correlated, which is perhaps why the former 
turns insignificant, when the latter is integrated into the regression). Governance 
and civil war also keep the signs that are consistent with the model expectations.  
Summing up, given the results of the different panel estimation models, 
presented in regressions (1) to (11), some overall statements can be made. 
Beginning with those demand-side variables that are the most robust to changes in 
the estimation technique, the sovereign rating and the closeness variables do show 
the significant results and consistent with the theoretical model. The war variable 
has a consistently positive effect on Diaspora Bonds, which was not expected by 
the theoretical model, but can be explained by patriotic motives of solidarity in 
times of crises. Still, it is surprising that intrastate wars do have such an effect that 
would rather be attributed to natural disasters or interstate wars. Governance is not 
significant in the Tobit regressions, but apart from those, it always has the expected 
impact on Diaspora Bonds. Good governance in the home country is a factor which 
is certainly decisive for the Diaspora investors. As for the spread variable, no 
significant effect could be observed. It must be accounted for the few observations 
available on this variable. Still, this result of an insignificance of the spread is 
consistent with other empirical studies on the behaviour of Diasporas (Akkoyunlu, 
2008). Moving on to the supply-side, it is certainly the remittances that are very 
consistent in the expected way throughout estimations (5) to (11). In the OLS they 
have a negative sign, indicating that the OLS regressions might be biased in the 
present case. Inflation is not significant in regressions (1) to (8), then it turns to a 
negative value in the selection equations, as the theoretically expected substituting 
effect suggests. Obviously, this variable does only have an impact on Diaspora 
Bonds via the selection mechanism.  
The foreign exchange variable, which is seen as one of the main reasons for 
issuing Diaspora Bonds by the theoretical model, has the expected negative sign, 
when significant. Yet it is only significant in regressions (3), (5), and (7). The 
budget deficit variable has been excluded from all regressions, except (1), due to 
insufficient data. However, it never yielded a significant effect if included.  
The external debt variable is negative and significant as expected in the 
selection equations (7), (8), and (9) and also in regression (1). However, in the 
Tobit regressions it has a significant positive effect, which is unexpected. This 
makes the external debt variable rather unreliable. ODA further strengthens the 
theoretical model by having the expected negative sign and being significant 
through all regressions apart from the OLS and PPML regressions. Finally, FDI 
consistently has a significant positive influence on Diaspora Bonds, as opposed to 
the theoretical model, yet an explanation in which this variable acts rather on the 
demand side, could be provided. 
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3.3. Time-series analysis for Israel 
After having analysed the complete dataset for all countries at all points of time, 
this section provides a close insight on the case of Israel, which has the longest 
experience of Diaspora Bonds. Israel's non-negotiable bonds are clearly a success 
story of integrating a Diaspora into the development process. This could be a role 
model for other developing countries. Additionally, the data on Israel's Diaspora 
Bonds is more comprehensive than for any other country in the complete dataset. 
This is why a time-series analysis on this single country is important. It should also 
be investigated, whether Israel is a different case than the other countries and if the 
determinants of success of the Israeli Diaspora Bonds are different ones. The 
results of the time-series analysis will highlight, whether the results are consistent 
with the panel analysis and further strengthen the model hypotheses. Finally, the 
time-series analysis for Israel allows controlling for the income of the Diaspora. As 
nearly 70% of the Jewish Diaspora lives in the United States of America (Jewish 
Agency for Israel 2009), it is reasonable to take the U.S. GDP per capita as an 
indicator for the income if the Israeli Diaspora Bonds target group. Two 
restrictions needed to be made for the present case of Israel. Firstly, there is hardly 
any or no data at all for the following variables: Domestic debt, external debt and 
(G - T). Some variables are time-invariant or show very little variation: Rating, 
Governance, Maturity, Denomination, Currency and Civil War. Also, there are 
again heavy pair wise correlations between the independent variables, in particular 
for the newly introduced explanatory variable YUS, the U.S. GDP per capita. 
Secondly, there is only a quite short time-series of 34 observations available. 
Consequently, only a very limited model can be estimated.26  
As a first step, the unrestricted model for the three explanatory variables log 
U.S. GDP per capita, Remittances and ODA is estimated.27 The dependent variable 
is the log of BE. The log form of BE and YUS was applied for smoothing the data. 
The data covers the time span between 1973 and 2006. The Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test for all three variables was performed subsequently. This test could not reject 
the null hypothesis that there is a unit root, consequently the series are non-
stationary. The lag-order statistics suggested a one-year lag for all variables (in 
contrast to what has been assumed in the panel-model).  
As a second step, the long-run relationship is calculated from the unrestricted 
model. This is presented in the following equation: 
 
log (BE) = 8.149 + 1.65 log (YUS) + 27.31 REM – 6.797 ODA             (14) 
 
In the long run, US per capita income and remittances have a positive impact on 
Diaspora Bonds but ODAs have a negative impact.  
According to the Wald-test, the variables jointly have the assumed significant 
long-run relationship, supporting the model previously set up (The Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no long-run correlation). Consequently, this is a 
cointegrating set of variables: 
 
WALD test: Chi2 (3) = 45.3687 [0.0000]***                (15) 
 
Using the results of this long-term equation as error correction term28 and 
plugging it in into a second equation, allows us to estimate a conditional model. In 
this conditional model, short run and long run effects can be separated. The 
conditional model consists of one-year lagged ECM from Regression (14) and first 
difference of the log U.S. GDP per capita. The dependent variable is now the first 
difference in log of Diaspora Bond balance (first differences are required for 
estimating the short-run model). The first difference of U.S. GDP per capita is 
significantly positive in the short run, indicating that investments in Diaspora 
Bonds increase with a higher income of the Diaspora in the host country. The 
ECM-term, which stands for the long-run effects of the U.S. GDP per capita, ODA 
and remittances, is also significant (see Table 5).  
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Table 4. Coefficients of the unrestricted equation for Israel 
 
 
The results from this Error-Corrected Model indicate that the GDP per capita in 
the host country has a significant and strong effect on Diaspora Bonds in the short- 
and long-run. A decrease in host country GDP of 10% results in a decrease in 
Diaspora Bonds balance of 7%. Such host country macroeconomic determinants 
are also found for remittances sending, this supports the findings at hand (Vargas-
Silva & Huang 2006). Especially having in mind the current financial crisis, where 
not only the GDP of many host countries, but also remittances and ODA have 
decreased; this effect should not be neglected.  
The time-series analysis of the Israeli experience with Diaspora Bond was 
restrained by the rather short period of analysis of only 34 years. Still, for the 
available data on ODA, remittances and the U.S. GDP per capita it could be 
showed that long term effects can be differentiated from short-term effects. Doing 
so, three innovative statements as compared to the panel models can be made. 
Firstly, the long-run determinants for Israel are consistent with the model and the 
panel data analysis. ODA and Remittances do have the expected signs in the long-
run and are jointly significant. Secondly, extending the panel model, it could be 
showed that also the U.S. GDP per capita, as the host country income, has effects 
in the long run and in the short run. This is an important insight, as up to now, 
global macroeconomic mechanisms have been ignored by the model.29 It should not 
be neglected, though, that the concept of Diaspora Bonds also depends on the 
income of the Diaspora in their respective host countries. Diaspora members whose 
income rises are consequently more interested in investing their funds in Diaspora 
Bonds. Thirdly, it could also be showed that the long-run determinants do have a 
joint significant impact on the short run, too (this is shown via the ECM-term). 
This implies that policy makers will need to consider all variables together. 
Receiving more ODA could be an alternative to Diaspora Bonds, however, the 
costs of ODA, especially when containing a large share of ODA loans, must not be 
ignored.  
Remittances do have the expected positive impact on Diaspora Bonds, which 
supports the theoretical model that suggests remittances (as % of GNI) are an 
indicator that home countries use for their decision on issuing a Diaspora Bond. 
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study investigates the theoretical and empirical determinants of Diaspora 
Bonds. Empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
model. The most robust variables are the closeness indicator and the sovereign 
rating, both on the demand-side. With high confidence, it can be said that the closer 
in terms of remittances per migrant a Diaspora is to its home country, the more 
successful will Diaspora Bonds be. And also the better a country's sovereign rating, 
the more Diaspora investment into this instrument will be made. Robust to all 
specifications, the spread of the Diaspora Bonds never showed significant 
correlation to the dependent variable. This implies that the Diaspora does not base 
its investment decision in Diaspora Bonds on the ground of pure profit-
maximisation. But the variable also does not indicate a constant patriotic discount. 
It seems therefore that the patriotic discount is not per se an element of a Diaspora 
Bond. This is an important feature of Diaspora Bonds relative to normal 
investments. Good governance mostly has a positive effect as suggested by the 
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theoretical model. Civil war, however, contradicting the model, mostly yields more 
investments into Diaspora Bonds. Ketkar & Ratha (2009b) suggest that the 
Diaspora may feel obliged to support the home country in particular in times of 
turmoil. This mechanism can be understood analogous with the case of remittances 
during natural disasters in the home country, Yang (2007) and Yang & Choi 
(2007).  
The supply-side factors are far more sensitive to the model specification. FDI is, 
in contrast to the predictions of the theoretical model, positive if it is significant. It 
was expected that Diaspora Bonds and FDI have substituting effects in attracting 
foreign currency. The empirically estimated effect, though, points towards first-
mover effects, which play rather on demand-side. In the eyes of the Diaspora 
investors, high FDI may be a signal for a government's trustworthiness in the 
handling of financial investments and hence, also for Diaspora Bonds. ODA has, in 
accordance with the theoretical model, a negative effect where significant, thus 
supporting the view of it as a "cheaper" alternative to all other kinds of external 
borrowing. Also foreign exchange, when significant, has the expected negative 
influence on (the countries supply of) Diaspora Bonds. This underlines the 
countries primary aim in issuing Diaspora Bonds, to raise foreign exchange. As for 
the government's budget deficit, probably the lack of data was responsible, that this 
variable never turned significant. Inflation turned significant and negative (the 
expected correlation) only in the Heckman regressions. Reliable statements on the 
role of inflation, which was supposed to measure money printing as a substitute for 
Diaspora Bonds, can therefore not be made. External debt, though, seems to be 
such a substitute. Finally, remittances proved to be negative only in the OLS 
regressions. In the other models, they had a positive sign when significant. This 
would be in line with the model, which suggested that remittances are a signal for 
the funds the Diaspora has at it's disposal and therewith providing the issuing 
government an indicator for the Diaspora Bond's success.  
Moving on to the time-series analysis for the Israeli case, notwithstanding the 
limitations in data for this particular country, an error-corrected model could be 
applied to investigate the influence of remittances, ODA and U.S. GDP per capita 
on Israeli Diaspora Bonds over 34 years. It could be shown that remittances as well 
as ODA do have the same influence on Diaspora Bonds as expected from the 
theoretical model and as proven in the panel data analysis. Additionally, including 
the U.S. GDP per capita, the theoretical model could even be enhanced. The U.S. 
being the main host country for the Israeli Diaspora, this variable is able to control 
for macroeconomic effects in the host country and their impact on Diaspora Bonds. 
Applying an error-corrected model allowed to differentiate short-term effects from 
long-term effects. This model showed that in the long term, remittances, ODA and 
the U.S. GDP per capita are jointly significantly related to Diaspora Bonds. In the 
short run, the host country GDP per capita again has a very strong influence on 
Diaspora Bonds. A higher economic growth in the host country hence yields a 
higher increase of the Diaspora Bond balance in the home country. This result 
confirms the importance of host country economic factors that have been largely 
ignored in the panel analysis. And it also has implications for the current financial 
crisis, where the U.S. GDP per capita growth is slowing down.  
Now the task is inferring for which countries it could be an interesting option to 
issue Diaspora Bonds, additional to those that are already covered in this analysis. 
Supply factors are not considered here, in line with the Heckman regression 
applied. This model suggested that those factors rather have an impact on the 
decision whether to issue a Diaspora Bond in the first place, but not on the amount 
sold. Consequently, in table 6, countries are listed with respect to their closeness, 
remittances, governance, sovereign rating (those are the variables found to have a 
significant effects on Diaspora Bond demand) and total migrants (to demonstrate 
the scale a Diaspora Bond might have for these countries).  
Table 6 presents those countries that fit best into the characteristics a country 
that wants to use the instrument of Diaspora Bonds should provide. Romania in 
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Europe, El Salvador in Central America, Nigeria in Africa and Indonesia in Asia 
could be the most promising candidates. Not only judging from the closeness 
indicator, but also concerning rating and governance they would fit the model quite 
well. Those countries without rating (Algeria and Azerbaijan), those with low 
closeness (Georgia and Azerbaijan) and those with bad governance (Vietnam, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Algeria and Azerbaijan) may be among those who 
could encounter problems in issuing Diaspora Bonds.  
 
Table 5. Countries that might consider issuing Diaspora Bonds 
 
 
A final remark should be made concerning the final purpose of the funds raised 
by Diaspora Bonds. As already mentioned above, not much is known about the 
utilisation of these funds. The World Bank has a focus on Diaspora-for-
Development issues (World Bank, 2006). But also the British Department for 
International Development (DFID) and later even the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) have recognised the potential of 
migrants beyond remittances, Weitzenegger (2008). The DFID even considered a 
project which intended to initiate a Diaspora Bond in Bangladesh targeting 
explicitly non-resident Bangladeshi in the United Kingdom. The project was turned 
down, however, due to the fact that already a Diaspora Bond instrument (the Wage 
Earner's Development Bonds, WEDB) existed. The DFID decided that it was easier 
to work towards an issue of the WEDB in British Pound than to promote another 
Diaspora Bond (Department for International Development (UK) (2008). Hence, a 
clear declaration of the purpose of Diaspora Bond funds, perhaps integrated in 
general guidelines for such bonds provided by an international agency such as the 
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would make the bonds far 
more transparent and the issuing governments accountable. 
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Notes 
 
1  This is based on the assumption that migrants are more loyal than the financial investors in times of 
stress and interested in financing infrastructure, housing, health and education projects.  
2  The issuers of Diaspora Bonds by retailing small denominations ranging from $100-$10,000 can 
target relatively poor migrants. 
3  Indeed, the governments of India and Israel have raised about $40 billion through Diaspora Bonds, 
and preliminary estimates suggest that Sub Saharan African countries have potential to raise $5-10 
billion per year by issuing Diaspora Bonds, see Ketkar & Ratha (2010) and Ratha (2010a). 
Furthermore, if each 200,000 Haitians in abroad invest $1,000 in Diaspora Bonds, this would raise 
$200 million, see Ratha (2010b). His preliminary calculations even suggest that a $100 million 
grant from official (or private) donors to guarantee such bonds on an annual rolling basis for 10 
years could actually generate $600 million of additional funding for Haiti. 
4  Inflation as a measure for excessive money printing is used in our empirical study. 
5  This was indeed the case for India. 
6  While borrowing decreases with programme aid, there is no effect on borrowing with technical 
assistance and food aid. 
7  And also the fact that the articles cited above have the general assumption that countries do not 
have the access to non-concessional external borrowing. 
8  The term Treasury bill is used here as a synonym for a sovereign bond with maturity longer than 
one year. 
9  This is also consistent with Jewish Diaspora investors who paid a steep price premium which 
characterizes a large patriotic yield discount see Ketkar & Ratha (2009b). 
10  The difference to the usually analyzed "spread" of a bond is that the "spread" normally measures 
the interest difference between two bonds with different risk ratings. What is been looked at here is 
the interest difference of two bonds with the same risk rating. 
11  If a certain degree of good governance is hypothesized. In the worst case of a dictatorial 
government, it may have as well the adverse effect. 
12  The altruism that has been described here is maybe not even a true one. Firstly, it is limited to the 
Diaspora's home country. And secondly, the reason for lending money to the home country can be 
the expectation of a better investment climate or better living standards for the family in the future. 
Whether this intention is to be labeled "egoism" or "altruism" is questionable and a question 
certainly not easy to answer.    
13  Although remittances are observable and measurable; there is a large amount of money remitted 
through informal channels. Freund & Spatafora (2008) report that estimates for informal flows 
range from 50-250 % of recorded flows globally. 
14  Extensive discussions of applications of the simultaneous equation model can be found in Greene 
(2002, p.393) and Gujarati (2003, p.717). 
15  Note that, Greene (2002, p.381) mentions that in the macroeconomic context the definition of 
endogenous and exogenous "is of fairly limited use in macroeconomics, where almost no variable 
can be said to be truly exogenous". 
16  The fact that Israel has adjusted its Diaspora Bonds often in the last decade certainly conflicts with 
this assumption. However, in the dataset covered, this seems to be rather the exception. 
17  The coefficient of regression (1) suggests that an increase in remittances per migrant of one US$, 
increases Diaspora Bonds balance by a 118'000 US$. 
18  The Freedom House governance index increases with worse governance. 
19  Akkoyunlu (2008) makes similar findings when analysing remittances from Turkish workers in 
Germany. 
20  "False" zeros can for example occur, when missing values are coded 0. 
21  Note that Wooldridge (2002, p.518) calls such a model a "corner solution model". 
22  The Zero Inflated Poisson and Negative Binomial regression. 
23  Note that in gravity models, the dependent variable (trade) needs to be in the log-linear form and 
the log of zero is not defined, while the log of 1 equals zero. 
24  The xtpqml Stata package (http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/timothy.simcoe/xtpqml.txt is used, as 
suggested by Desbordes & Vicard (2009) to use fixed effects and compute robust standard errors. 
25  It could theoretically be argued that the inclusion of countries like Kenya or South Africa would 
have changed the situation at hand. In those cases, a lack of demand could have been a reason for 
abandoning the projects. Perhaps, an "unofficial" offer already existed but was retired when 
observing insufficient demand.  
26  Econometric methodology in this Section closely follows Akkoyunlu (2008). 
27  Time-series regressions and tests were all calculated using Pc-Give 10.2, see Doornik & Hendry 
(2001). 
28  For the use of Error Corrected Models (ECM) in political science, see Keele & Boef (2004). 
29  Vargas-Silva & Huang (2006) accounted for this effect indirectly. 
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Appendix  
Table 1. Data Overview 
 
 
Table 7. Pair-wise correlations 
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